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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Representing the most comprehensive reform of the financial services industry in 
nearly seventy years, President Clinton signed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial 
Modernization Act of 1999 into law on November 12, 1999.1  The Act included 
                                                                
1Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 
Stat. 1338 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).   
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provisions designed to facilitate affiliation among banks, securities firms and 
insurance companies,2 as well as provisions requiring financial service companies to 
disclose the institutions’ privacy policies with respect to nonpublic personal 
information.3  To foster competition and innovation in the financial services industry, 
title I of the Act repealed sections 20 and 32 of the Glass-Steagall Act 4 and amended 
section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956.5  While the primary focus of 
title I was to break down the firewalls between banks, securities firms, and insurance 
companies by creating financial holding companies, the Act includes a provision that 
allows these newly created financial institutions to engage in any activity that is 
determined “to be financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity.”6  One 
of the first major efforts by regulators to expand the list of permissible activities 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is to allow financial holding companies and 
financial subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks to engage in real estate brokerage 
and real estate management services.7   
Part II of this Note will provide a brief history of the financial service regulations 
that preceded the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  Part III will discuss the legislative 
history of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, provide a brief overview of the Act, and 
detail the provision which may allow financial holding companies to engage in real 
estate brokerage and management activities.  Part IV of this Note will discuss the 
pending legislation on this issue, including the proposed rule requesting public 
comment and the current bills in the House and Senate against allowing banks to 
engage in the proposed activities.  Part V will detail the arguments on both sides of 
the issue, primarily from the perspective of industry groups.  Finally, Part VI of this 
Note will explain how the current proposal to permit banks to engage in real estate 
brokerage and management activities highlights the inadequacies of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.   
                                                                
2Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act §§ 101- 161.   
3Id. § 501- 527. 
4Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).  
512 U.S.C. § 1843 (2000). 
6Id. § 1843(k)(1)(A).  
7Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307 (Jan. 3, 2001) 
(to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 225).  In addition to the proposed rule, the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Secretary of the Treasury have issued three other proposals to expand the list of 
permissible activities under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  The first related to banks acting as 
“finders” (putting buyers and sellers together in transactions negotiated by the buyers and 
sellers themselves).  The second involved safeguarding and transferring financial assets and 
facilitating financial transactions for third parties.  The third concerned a determination of 
whether certain types of expanded data processing activities are complementary to financial 
activities. Hearings, infra note 80 (statement of Hon. Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System).  At the time of this writing, only the proposal 
regarding banks acting as “finders” has been finalized.  Bank Holding Companies and Change 
in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2001). 
2https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/7
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II.  A BRIEF HISTORY OF FINANCIAL SERVICE INDUSTRY REGULATION  
A.  The National Bank Act of 1863 
The American financial service industry has historically been heavily regulated, 
with three laws bearing particular significance to the events that led to the enactment 
of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  The first influential regulation was the National 
Bank Act of 1863.8  Promulgated at the height of the Civil War, the National Bank 
Act of 1863 created the dual bank regulation system that is particular to America and 
is still prevalent today.9  Under this dual system, banks may choose to be state-
chartered banks or federally-chartered national banks.10  One of the primary factors 
considered when deciding between a state or national charter is the difference 
between regulating bodies.11  Nationally chartered banks fall under the regulatory 
aegis of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, a division of the Department 
of the Treasury.12  State banks are primarily regulated by the regulating bodies in 
their respective states, and can be subjected to federal regulation by electing to 
become a member of the Federal Reserve System or by insuring deposits through the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.13  Though the emergence of state wild card 
statutes14 and federal preemption15 has had a smoothing effect on the differences 
between federal and state banking charters, the dual banking system remains an 
integral part of the U.S. banking system.16 
B.  The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 
The next major law affecting the powers of U.S. banking institutions was the 
Glass-Steagall Act of 1933.17  The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted during the Great 
Depression in response to the financial crisis that began with the stock market crash 
of 1929 and led to widespread bank failures, eroding the public confidence in the 
                                                                
8National Bank Act of 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665, repealed by National Bank Act of 1864, 
ch. 106 § 62, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)  
9Henry N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking 
System. 73 CORNELL L. REV. 677, 681 (1988). 
10National Bank Act of 1863 at 668. 
11Butler, supra note 9, at 682.  
12Id. at 677.  
13Id. 
14Id. at 705.  Wild card statutes is the generic name given to statutes that “automatically 
grant state banks the same powers as national banks whenever a change occurs in the laws 
affecting national banks.”  Id.  A majority of states have adopted such statutes.  Id.   
15Id. at 694.  Under the Supemacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, federal laws will 
preempt state laws when there is a direct conflict.  With respect to banks and other financial 
service providers, “the federal government has passed preemptive legislation in the important 
areas of reserve requirements, separation of commercial banking from investment banking, 
and the regulation of bank holding companies.”  Id. 
16Butler, supra note 9, at 678. 
17Banking Act of 1933.  
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banking industry as a whole.18  The enactment of the Glass-Steagall Act “was 
predicated on the assumption that the securities activities of commercial banks and 
their affiliates played a significant role in the stock market crash.”19  The broad 
objectives of the Glass-Steagall Act were to restore confidence in the commercial 
banking system and to eliminate perceived inherent conflicts of interest by separating 
commercial banking activities from investment banking activities.20  The results were 
the prohibition of Federal Reserve member banks from affiliating with organizations 
principally engaged in the investment banking business,21 the prohibition of 
investment banks from participating in commercial banking,22 and the prohibition of 
management interlocks between commercial banks and securities firms.23   
C.  The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
The regulatory scheme set forth by the Glass-Steagall Act appeared adequate 
until the early 1950’s when “banks circumvented section 20 [of the Glass-Steagall 
Act] by forming bank holding companies, which were allowed to control both 
commercial banking and investment banking subsidiaries.”24  The Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956,25 however, closed this loophole by limiting ownership of 
nonbanking subsidiaries to subsidiaries that engaged in activities determined to be 
“so closely related to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper 
incident thereto.”26  Despite the restrictions of the Bank Holding Company Act, the 
bank holding company remains the most prevalent organizational structure for banks 
in the United States today.27 
Through “Regulation Y,” the Federal Reserve Board has continually added to the 
list of activities determined to be “closely related to banking.”28  An example of an 
activity added to the list of permissible activities under the Bank Holding Company 
Act is certain courier or high speed transportation services.29  The Federal Reserve 
                                                                
18A.J. Herbert III, Comment: Requiem on the Glass-Steagall Act: Tracing the Evolution 
and Current Status of Bank Involvement in Brokerage Activities, 63 TUL. L. REV. 157, 161-62 
(1988). 
19Id. at 162. 
20Id.  
2112 U.S.C. § 377 (2000), repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338. 
2212 U.S.C. § 378 (2000). 
2312 U.S.C. § 78 (2000), repealed by Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub L. No. 106-
102, 133 Stat. 1338. 
24Herbert, supra note 18, at 169-70. 
25Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). 
2612 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8).   
27Herbert, supra note 18, at 170. 
28Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.4 (2001).   
29Nat’l Courier Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.,  516 F.2d 1229, 1232 
(D.C. Cir. 1975). 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/7
2002-03] GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 107 
Board added these activities to the list in 1972.30  In 1975, a courier association 
challenged the regulation allowing bank holding companies to engage in such 
activities, claiming, in part, that the activities were not “closely related to banking.”31  
The D.C. Court of Appeals set the standard for determining whether or not an 
activity is “closely related to banking” in National Courier.  The Court stated that the 
Federal Reserve Board must “articulate the ways in which banking activities and the 
proposed activities are assertedly connected, and must determine, not arbitrarily or 
capriciously, that the connections are close.”32 The court then enumerated a number 
of factors for the Federal Reserve Board to consider in determining whether a 
proposed activity is “closely related to banking.”33  
While the “closely related to banking” standard would remain in effect until the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the restrictions imposed by both the Glass-Steagall Act 
and the Bank Holding Company Act gradually decreased over time, “primarily from 
more permissive interpretations by the regulatory agencies, and . . . from deference 
to these interpretations by the courts,”34 culminating in the enactment of the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.   
III.  MODERNIZATION OF FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION –  
THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT 
A.  Background and Legislative History of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was the result of years of debate over regulation of 
the financial services industry.  The Act “[did] not represent a dramatic departure 
from what was already happening in the marketplace with the acquiescence of 
federal and state regulators,”35 but was merely a codification of the eroding divisions 
between banks, securities firms, and insurance companies.  While industry groups 
had been calling for the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the reformation of 
financial services regulation for years, the effort received a big push by the 
announcement of a proposed merger between industry giants Citicorp and Travelers 
Insurance.36  While the merger was technically impermissible under the law, 
                                                                
30Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.86 (2001). 
31Nat’l Courier Ass’n, 516 F.2d at 1232.   
32Id. at 1237. 
33Id. The court enumerated the following factors for the Federal Reserve Board to 
consider, which, if met, would support a finding that an activity is closely related to banking: 
1. Banks generally have in fact provided the proposed services. 
2. Banks generally provide services that are operationally or functionally so 
similar to the proposed services as to equip them particularly well to provide 
the proposed service. 
3. Banks generally provide services that are so integrally related to the 
proposed services as to require their provision in a specialized form.  Id.  
34Herbert, supra note 18, at 171. 
35Douglas P. Faucette, The Impact of Convergence and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on 
the Insurance Industry, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 647 (2000). 
36See Yvette D. Kantrow & Liz Moyer, Citi, Travelers: A Global Leader Takes Shape, 
THE AM. BANKER, Apr. 7, 1998, at 1.  On April 6, 1998 Citicorp and Travelers Insurance 
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“Citigroup [was] betting that regulators [would] allow it up to five years to divest 
impermissible activities, and that Congress [would] enact enabling legislation before 
the five-year period expire[d].”37  Apparently confident that Congress would do just 
that, a number of large financial institutions announced mega-mergers in the wake of 
the Citigroup announcement.  Within two weeks of the Citigroup announcement, 
Nationsbank and Bank of America announced a merger agreement, creating the 
largest bank in the United States.  On that same day, Banc One Corporation and First 
Chicago NBD Bank announced plans to join, creating by far the largest midwest 
bank.38  While the success of the latter mergers was not contingent upon the repeal of 
the Glass-Steagall Act as was the Citigroup deal, the announcements were a clear 
indication that the nation’s preeminent banks were posturing for the imminent 
changes to come.   
An early version of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was introduced in 1998 as H.R. 
10 and it passed in the House by a single vote.39  The bill then went to the Senate; 
however, after much debate and compromise in the Senate Banking Committee, the 
congressional session ended before the bill made it to the Senate floor for a vote.40  
The bill, however, would find new life when Congress reconvened the following 
year, when “[i]n January 1999, Representative James A. Leach (R-Iowa), Chairman 
of the House Banking and Financial Services Committee, reintroduced H.R. 10, 
which was based largely on the Senate compromise bill drafted the prior year.”41  
The House Banking Committee held hearings on the bill shortly thereafter, as did the 
House Commerce Committee headed by Chairman Thomas Bliley (R-Va).  The bill 
was passed by the House of Representatives on July 1, 1999, by a vote of 343-86.42   
Senator Phil Gramm (R-Tex), Chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, 
introduced a more streamlined financial modernization bill, also in early 1999.43  
While the vote was along partisan lines, the republican-controlled Senate passed this 
bill with a 54-44 vote on May 6, 1999.44  A compromise bill was compiled in the fall 
of 1999, which passed both houses of Congress on November 4, 1999.45  The 
                                                          
announced a $70 billion merger which would create the largest financial services company in 
the world, to be known as Citigroup, with nearly $700 billion in assets.  Id.  
37William M. Isaac, Challenge to Policymakers-and Dealmakers Too; As Lawmakers 
Fiddle, Market Forces Transforming the Financial Industry, THE AM. BANKER, Apr. 24, 1998, 
at 7.   
38Id.   
39Douglas P. Faucette, The Impact of Convergence and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act on 
the Insurance Industry, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 623, 626 (2000). 
40Id. 
41Id. at 626-27.   
42Id. at 627.   
43Id. at 627. 
44Faucette, supra note 39, at 628. 
45Id. at 629. 
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol50/iss1/7
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Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was signed into law by President Clinton on November 12, 
1999.46   
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created a vehicle known as the “financial holding 
company,” which greatly expanded the scope of permissible activities for banks and 
other financial service providers.47  According to the Act, a financial holding 
company is authorized to engage in the same activities as bank holding companies48 
(either directly or through nonbank subsidiaries), and is further permitted to engage 
in activities deemed to be “financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.”49  
In order for a bank holding company to qualify as a financial holding company, it 
must make application to the Federal Reserve and meet the specific guidelines 
outlined by that agency.50  Essentially the Act requires that each of the depository 
institutions controlled by the financial holding company is well-capitalized,51 well-
managed,52 and must have received a Community Reinvestment Act rating of 
“satisfactory” or “outstanding.”53  If a bank holding company does not meet of each 
of these specific criteria, it will not be granted financial holding company status.54  
Furthermore, if a financial holding company fails to remain in compliance with these 
requirements, it may be forced to divest itself of financial activities not available to 
bank holding companies.55 
Although the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act created the financial holding company 
structure, the traditional bank holding company structure still remains an option.56  
Therefore, bank holding companies that do not meet the specific requirements for 
financial holding company status (well-capitalized, well-managed, and in 
satisfactory compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act) can nonetheless 
continue to own bank and nonbank financial subsidiaries.  The Act did not change 
the fact that any activities in which a bank holding company wishes to engage in 
                                                                
46Id. 
4712 U.S.C. § 1841(p) (2000). 
4812 U.S.C. § 1843(j)(4)(C). 
4912 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A). 
5012 U.S.C. § 1843(l). 
5112 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(A).  The Federal Reserve considers a domestic bank, thrift or trust 
company to be well-capitalized where it has a total risk based capital ratio of not less than ten 
percent, a Tier 1 capital ratio of not less than six percent, and a leverage ratio of not less than 
five percent.  Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.2(r) 
(2001).   
5212 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(B).  The Federal Reserve considers a domestic bank, thrift or trust 
company to be well-managed if in its latest examination it received a composite rating of at 
least “satisfactory” and a management rating of at least “satisfactory.”  12 C.F.R. § 225.2(s)(1) 
(2001).   
5312 C.F.R. § 225.82(d) (2001).  
5412 U.S.C. § 1843(l)(c). 
5512 U.S.C. § 1843(m).  
56See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). 
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must be “closely related to banking.”57  There is, however, one caveat.  The Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act so that bank holding 
companies could only engage in activities that had been determined by the Federal 
Reserve Board to be “closely related to banking” as of November 11, 1999, the day 
before Gramm-Leach-Bliley’s enactment.58  This essentially froze bank holding 
companies in time, requiring any institution wishing to engage in activities not 
permitted prior to the Act to qualify as a financial holding company.  Thus, while the 
bank holding company structure may continue to be a viable option for institutions 
with no intention of expanding present product offerings beyond what was 
previously allowed, or for institutions that are unable to meet the heightened 
requirements for financial holding company status, the financial holding company 
will likely be the vehicle for continued evolution of the financial services industry, 
with bank holding companies decreasing significantly in number, possibly towards 
extinction. 
B.  The Emergence of a New Standard  
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act enumerated a number of activities that are 
permissible for financial holding companies and financial subsidiaries of national 
banks.59  In order to adapt to changes in the financial marketplace, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act amended the Bank Holding Company Act to include a provision 
that allows the Federal Reserve Board to determine permissible activities for 
financial holding companies.60  Prior to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act and the creation of the financial holding company, the Federal Reserve Board 
was required to find that a proposed activity was “closely related to banking” if it 
was to be a permissible activity for bank holding companies.61  Under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act, however, the Board must only determine that the proposed activity 
is “financial in nature or incidental to such financial activity; or is complementary to 
                                                                
57Id.  
58Id. 
59The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act states that the following activities shall be considered to 
be financial in nature: 
(A) Lending, exchanging, transferring, investing for others, or safeguarding 
money or securities. 
(B) Insuring, guaranteeing, or indemnifying against loss harm, damage, illness, 
disability, or death, or providing and issuing annuities, and acting as principal, 
agent, or broker for purposes of the foregoing, in any State. 
(C) Providing financial, investment, or economic advisory services, including 
advising an investment company. . . 
(D) Issuing or selling instruments representing interests in pools of assets 
permissible for a bank to hold directly. 
(E) Underwriting, dealing in, or making a market in securities. 
(F) Engaging in any activity that the Board has determined, by order or regulation 
that is in effect on November 12, 1999, to be so closely related to banking or 
managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident thereto.   
12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4)(A)-(F) (2000). 
60Id.  
6112 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8). 
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a financial activity and does not propose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness 
of depository institutions or the financial system generally.”62  This provision of the 
Act has spurred a renewed effort to allow financial holding companies and financial 
subsidiaries of national banks to engage in real estate brokerage and management 
services. 
The banking industry has tried unsuccessfully to gain permission to engage in 
real estate brokerage and management services in the past.  In 1972, the Federal 
Reserve Board determined that real estate brokerage was “not closely related to 
banking” for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act.63  In 1987, however, the 
Board solicited public comment on a proposal to allow bank holding companies to 
engage in real estate investment activities.64  The proposal included a provision that 
would have allowed banks to engage in “activities that are incidental to the 
ownership of real property, such as property management, maintenance and 
brokerage activities conducted in connection with real estate in which the bank had 
an interest,”65 though it did not propose to allow bank holding companies to engage 
generally in such activities.  The proposal, however, was never adopted in its final 
form.66  The issue is now being revisited by the Federal Reserve Board and the 
Secretary of the Treasury, because “[t]he [a]gencies believe that the [Gramm-Leach-
Bliley] Act’s ‘financial in nature or incidental’ standard represents a significant 
expansion of the ‘closely related to banking’ standard that the Board previously 
applied in determining the permissibility of activities for bank holding companies.”67 
IV. PENDING LEGISLATION  
A.  Joint Proposal of the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury 
As previously noted, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act provides a means by which 
the list of permissible activities in which a financial holding company may engage 
could be expanded beyond the list enumerated in the Act itself.68  The Act requires 
coordination between the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury 
wherein each agency must notify the other of any “request, proposal or application 
. . . for a determination of whether an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a 
financial activity.”69  The agency that did not receive the initial request then has 
                                                                
6212 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A),(B). 
63Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(c)(2001). 
The Federal Reserve Board has determined that the following activities are not closely related 
to banking as to be a proper incident thereto: insurance premium funding; underwriting life 
insurance not sold in connection with a credit transaction; real estate brokerage; land 
development; real estate syndication; management consulting; and property management. 12 
C.F.R. § 225.126 (2001). 
64Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 52 Fed. Reg. 543 (1987). 
65Id.  
66Id. 
67Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307, 308.   
68See generally 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k). 
6912 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2)(A)(i).  
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thirty days to notify the other agency, in writing, of its belief that the activity is not 
financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity.70 
If neither agency objects to a request, the agencies may then initiate a public 
rulemaking to find the activity permissible under the Act.71  The Act enumerates the 
factors which the agencies are to consider when making a determination of whether 
an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity, which are: 
(A) the purposes of [the Bank Holding Company Act] and the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act;  
(B) changes or reasonably expected changes in the marketplace in 
which financial holding companies compete;  
(C) changes or reasonably expected changes in the technology for 
delivering financial services, and;  
(D) whether such activity is necessary and appropriate to allow a 
financial holding company and the affiliates of a financial 
holding company to-- (i) compete effectively with any company 
seeking to provide financial services in the United States.72 
Shortly after the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the American 
Bankers Association73 and Fremont National Bank & Trust Company74 revisited the 
possibility of allowing banks to offer real estate brokerage and management services 
by petitioning the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury to 
determine that the activities are financial in nature under the expanded standard set 
forth in the Act.75  Two additional trade associations, the Financial Services 
Roundtable76 and the New York Clearing House Association77 also requested that the 
                                                                
7012 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(2). 
71Id.  
72Id. § 1843(k)(3). 
73The American Bankers Association is based in Washington, D.C. and represents banks 
on issues of national importance.  The ABA was founded in 1875 and represents all categories 
of banking institutions including community, regional and national banks and holding 
companies, savings banks and institutions, and trust companies.  See ABA, About ABA 
available at www.aba.com/About+ABA/default/html (last visited Feb. 13, 2002). 
74Fremont National Bank and Trust Company is located in Fremont, Nebraska.  The 
company was founded in 1871, and currently has 135 employees and four banking locations.  
See Fremont National Bank and Trust Co., at www.fremontnational.com/general/index/.html 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2002).  
75Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307.   
76The Financial Services Roundtable is a national association that represents 100 of the 
largest diversified financial service companies, including sixty-four commercial banking and 
thrift organizations, twelve insurance companies, seven securities or investment companies 
and four other types of financial service companies. Hearings, infra note 80 (statement of 
Richard J. Parsons, Executive Vice President, Bank of America Corporation, on behalf of The 
Financial Services Roundtable). 
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Board deem real estate brokerage a permissible activity for financial holding 
companies.78  
Pursuant to the Act, the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury 
consulted with each other and, in January 2001, issued a joint proposed rule and a 
request for public comment to determine that real estate brokerage and real estate 
management are activities that are financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity.79  The agencies requested public comment to the proposed rule with an 
initial public comment period of sixty days, ending March 2, 2001.80  Due to an 
overwhelming number of public comments and at the request of several members of 
Congress, the public comment period was extended for an additional sixty days, 
expiring May 2, 2001.81  A substantial number of the public comments were the 
result of a letter writing campaign against the proposed rule initiated by the National 
Association of REALTORS®.82   
If the rule is adopted as proposed, it will amend section 225.86 of Regulation Y83 
to include real estate brokerage and management services with certain limitations as 
permissible activities of financial holding companies.84  As part of the proposed rule, 
the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury defined both real estate 
brokerage and real estate management.  The rule defined real estate brokerage as 
“the business of bringing together parties interested in consummating a real estate 
purchase, sale, exchange, lease, or rental transaction and negotiating on behalf of 
such parties a contract relating to the transaction.”85  The rule then enumerated a 
number of specific activities that would fall under the panoply of real estate 
                                                          
77
“The New York Clearing House Association submitted its request on behalf of The Bank 
of New York Company, Inc.; Chase Manhattan Corporation; Citigroup, Inc.; J.P. Morgan, 
Inc.; Bankers Trust Company; Fleet Boston, Inc.; HSBC; Bank One Corporation; First Union 
Corporation; and Wells Fargo & Company.”  Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank 
Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307, 307 n.2.   
78Id. at 307.  
79Id.  
80Id. 
81Proposal by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the Secretary of 
the Treasury to Permit Financial Holding Companies and Subsidiaries of National Banks to 
Offer Real Estate Brokerage and Management Services: Hearing Before the House Financial 
Services Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, 107th Cong. (2001).  
[hereinafter Hearings] (opening statement of Hon. Spencer Bachus, Chairman, House 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit).   
82James R. Peterson, Sizing Up Real Estate Brokerage; First Test of Key GLB Provision 
Turns Into a Dustup, ABA BANKING JOURNAL, October, 2001, at 46 (2001).   
8312 C.F.R. § 225.86.   
84Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307, 313.  While 
allowing real estate brokerage and management, the amendment would prohibit financial 
holding companies from investing in or developing real estate as principal and from taking 
title to, acquiring, or holding any ownership interest in the real estate.  Regarding real estate 
management services, the financial holding companies would be further prohibited from 
directly or indirectly maintaining or repairing the real estate.  Id. 
85Id. at 308. 
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brokerage, but distinguished real estate brokerage from activities that involve the 
purchasing or selling of real estate as a principal.86 
The proposed rule defined real estate management as “the business of providing 
for others day-to-day management of real estate.”87  Again, the rule enumerated a 
number of specific activities considered to be real estate management activities, 
including: procuring tenants, negotiating leases, billing and collecting rent payments, 
and maintenance of real property.88  In the past, the Federal Reserve Board has 
explicitly determined that real estate brokerage and management services were not 
closely related to banking for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act.89  The 
question now becomes whether these activities, though not closely related to 
banking, are financial activities or incidentally related to financial activities for 
purposes of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  
B.  The Community Choice in Real Estate Act 
Both houses of Congress have recently proposed legislation in response to the 
rule proposed by the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury.  On 
December 6, 2001, Representative Ken Calvert (R-Cal) introduced H.R. 3424 “to 
amend [Section 4 of] the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and [Section 
5136A(b) of] the Revised Statutes of the United States to prohibit financial holding 
companies and national banks from engaging, directly or indirectly, in real estate 
brokerage or real estate management activities.”90  On December 18, 2001, Senator 
Wayne Allard (R-CO) introduced the mirror image of H.R. 3424 in the Senate.91  
These acts are commonly known as the “Community Choice in Real Estate Act,”92 
and if passed would moot the Board’s current proposal.  While both bills appear to 
have bipartisan support, neither bill appears to have the initial support of the 
Chairmen of the respective committees, Representative Spencer Bachus93 and 
                                                                
86Id.  
87Id. at 311. 
88Id. 
8912 C.F.R. § 225.126(c),(g). 
90Community Choice in Real Estate Act, H.R. 3424, 107th Cong. (2001).  Section 4 of the 
Bank Holding Company Act (12 U.S.C. § 1843) pertains to financial holding companies while 
§ 5136A(b) of the Revised Statutes of the United States pertains to financial subsidiaries of 
nationally chartered banks.  The two statutes are substantially similar in enumerating the 
permissible activities.   
91Community Choice in Real Estate Act, S. 1839, 107th Cong. (2001). 
92Community Choice in Real Estate Act, H.R. 3424, 107th Cong. (2001) and Community 
Choice in Real Estate Act, S. 1839, 107th Cong. (2001). 
93Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Financial Institutions 
and Consumer Credit.  
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Senator Paul Sarbanes.94  At the time of this writing, both bills have been referred to 
the respective committees, but no other action has taken place.95   
V.  TWO SIDES TO EVERY STORY  
A.  Arguments in Favor of Permitting Real Estate Brokerage 
and Management Activities 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act “neither specifically authorizes nor specifically 
forbids financial holding companies or financial subsidiaries of national banks to 
engage in real estate brokerage and management activities.”96  The Act does, 
however, prohibit financial subsidiaries from engaging in real estate investment and 
development.97  According to Laurence Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board, “[t]he 
existence of this limited real estate provision in the [Gramm-Leach-Bliley] Act 
suggests that the Congress thought about real estate activities in connection with the 
[A]ct and determined to leave unresolved the question of whether financial holding 
companies or financial subsidiaries should be permitted to act as real estate brokers 
or managers.”98   
The most ardent supporters for the inclusion of real estate brokerage and 
management services among the list of permissible activities for financial holding 
companies are members of the banking industry, represented in part by the Financial 
Services Roundtable99 and the American Bankers Association.100  These trade groups 
have advanced a number of reasons why real estate brokerage and real estate 
management services should be determined as financial in nature or incidental to a 
financial activity and therefore, permissible under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.101  
First, a number of depository institutions already engage in real estate brokerage.102  
According to Neil Milner, President and Chief Executive Officer of The Conference 
of State Bank Supervisors, “[twenty-five] states and the District of Columbia allow 
their state-chartered banks to conduct real estate brokerage.  In a number of states 
this activity has been allowed for ten to twenty years.  In one state . . . the activity 
has been allowable for over one hundred years.”103  Proponents of the dual banking 
                                                                
94Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs.   
95Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.01839: (last visited Feb. 19, 2002); http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.03424: (last visited Feb. 19, 2002).   
96Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System). 
97Id.  
98Id. 
99See supra note 76, and accompanying text. 
100See supra note 73, and accompanying text. 
10166 Fed. Reg. 307, 313.   
102Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Neil Milner, President and CEO, The Conference 
of State Bank Supervisors). 
103Id.  
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system note that “[t]he ability for state banks to test new products, services, powers 
and structures on a state-by-state basis, prior to issuing a broad grant of authority to 
institutions nationwide, has identified best practices for the delivery of financial 
services that has then been available to federally chartered institutions.”104  Thus, 
proponents of the proposed rule assert that a number of state-chartered banks have 
effectively engaged in real estate brokerage and management services for years, and 
now it is both necessary and appropriate for nationally chartered banks to engage in 
the activities as well.105  In addition to state-chartered banks, the Office of Thrift 
Supervision has also allowed service corporation subsidiaries of federal savings 
associations to provide general real estate brokerage services.106 
The proposed rule also notes that “banks and bank holding companies currently 
engage in a variety of activities that are functionally and operationally similar to real 
estate brokerage.”107  These activities include: securities brokerage services, private 
placement services, agency transactional services, and insurance agency services.108  
Proponents argue that real estate brokerage services are simply an additional form of 
agency services and are essentially no different from the permissible agency services 
already offered by banks and bank holding companies.109  
In addition to state-chartered banks and nationally-chartered thrifts, many of the 
other institutions against which financial holding companies currently compete are 
able to offer real estate brokerage services.110  The proposed rule provides several 
examples of diversified financial companies that are not subject to the Bank Holding 
Company Act that provide real estate brokerage services as well as more traditional 
financial services.111  These companies include General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation, Prudential Insurance Company, Cendant Corporation, and Long & 
Foster.112  Conversely, real estate brokerages are increasingly offering many of the 
services traditionally reserved for financial service companies, including, most 
notably, mortgage lending and insurance services.113  According to the testimony of 
Richard J. Parsons on behalf of the Financial Services Roundtable, nine of the ten 
leading real estate brokers cited by Realtor magazine compete with financial holding 
                                                                
104Id.  
105Id.  
106See Subordinate Organizations, 12 C.F.R. § 559.4(e)(4) (2001).   
107Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307, 309.   
108Id.  
109Id.  
110Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, Fed. Reg. 307, 310.   
111Id. at 310 n.23.  
112Id.  In addition to providing real estate brokerage services, the companies engage in the 
following activities traditionally considered financial activities:  General Motors Acceptance 
Corporation operates a thrift and makes mortgage loans; Prudential Insurance Company 
provides insurance and securities products; Cendant Corporation provides insurance products 
and mortgage loans; and Long & Foster provides mortgage loans and insurance products.  Id.  
113Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Richard J. Parsons, Executive Vice President, 
Bank of America Corporation, on behalf of The Financial Services Roundtable). 
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companies by offering mortgage loans or insurance.114  Furthermore, fifty-six percent 
of residential real estate brokerage firms with more than fifty agents currently offer 
mortgage lending services.115  Mr. Parsons further asserts, “the only financial 
institutions that uniformly cannot engage in real estate brokerage are financial 
holding companies and national banks.”116  Proponents, therefore, view the proposed 
initiative to be an attempt to level the competitive playing field, and deem approval 
of the regulation as “both necessary and appropriate to allow financial holding 
companies to compete effectively with real estate brokerage companies, as well as 
with federal thrifts, credit unions, and state banks.”117   
Advocates of the proposed regulation also note that the enhanced competition 
will benefit consumers.118  Currently, financial holding companies and their 
subsidiaries engage in virtually every other aspect of real estate transactions, 
including mortgage loans, performing real estate appraisals, providing escrow 
services and various insurance products related to real estate transactions, including 
title insurance, private mortgage insurance, and homeowner’s insurance.119  Allowing 
financial holding companies to offer real estate brokerage and management services 
would enable such institutions to provide convenient “one-stop shopping” for 
consumers and the increased competition would ostensibly result in lower 
transaction costs for consumers as well.120   
B.  Counter-Arguments of the National Association of REALTORS® and Others 
By far, the most vociferous opposition to the proposed regulation comes from the 
National Association of REALTORS® (hereinafter “NAR”), an organization that 
represents more than 760,000 real estate professionals practicing in all areas of 
residential and commercial real estate.121  The organization has referred to the 
proposed rule as “The Big Grab”122 and spearheaded a massive letter-writing 
campaign against the proposed rule during the public comment period.123   
                                                                
114Id.  
115Id. 
116Id.  
117Id.  
118Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Richard J. Parsons, Executive Vice President, 
Bank of America Corporation, on behalf of The Financial Services Roundtable). 
119Id. (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System).  
120Id. (statement of Richard J. Parsons, Executive Vice President, Bank of America 
Corporation, on behalf of The Financial Services Roundtable). 
121Id. (statement of Richard A. Mendenhall, President, National Association of 
REALTORS®).  
122See Realtor, www.realtor.org/GAPublic.nsf (last visited Jan. 9, 2002). 
123According to the American Bankers Association, the request for public comment “drew 
an astonishing 46,000 letters of comment, mostly from irate realtors.”  James R. Peterson, 
Sizing Up Real Estate Brokerage; First Test of Key GLB Provision Turns Into a Dustup, 
A.B.A. BANKING J., Oct., 2001, at 46. 
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The main contention of those opposed to the rule is the belief that real estate 
brokerage and management services are clearly commercial in nature, and permitting 
banks to engage in such activities would violate the very cornerstone of financial 
service industry regulation -  the need to separate banking from commerce.124  The 
NAR contends, “[r]eal estate brokerage involves the marketing and sale of tangible 
property, the very essence of commerce.”125  The organization notes that under the 
Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, real estate brokerage and management services 
were always deemed commercial activities and therefore, an impermissible ground 
for bank holding companies.126  The NAR feels that if real estate brokerage and 
management functions are deemed financial activities, there will be no demarcation 
between finance and commerce.  This belief was echoed by Representative Spencer 
Bachus, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, when he 
said “I believe that the wholesale entry of banks into the real estate business – while 
not in and of itself undermining safety and soundness – may serve to erode the long-
standing separation between banking and commerce that Congress most recently 
reaffirmed in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.”127   
A second contention by the rule’s opponents concerns the timing of the request 
by the banking industry trade groups, which came approximately one year after the 
enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.128  The Act requires the Federal Reserve 
Board and the Secretary of the Treasury to consider, inter alia, changes or 
reasonably expected changes in both the marketplace and in technology when 
determining whether an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity.129  The NAR states that “[n]o reasonable observer would suggest that there 
has been any significant change in the relevant technology, or in the business of real 
estate brokerage or management, since enactment of the [Gramm-Leach-Bliley] Act 
in late 1999.”130  In fact, the NAR asserts neither the marketplace nor technology has 
changed since debate on the Act began in earnest in the mid-1990’s.131  This, 
according to the NAR, coupled with the fact that real estate brokerage and 
management services are conspicuously absent from the enumerated list of activities 
automatically deemed financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity at the 
                                                          
This was confirmed by a representative of the Federal Reserve Board, who testified that 
“the vast majority of the comments have been submitted by individual real estate agents 
opposed to the proposal.”  Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, 
Member, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System).   
124Hearings, supra note 81 (opening statement of Richard A. Mendenhall, President, 
National Association of REALTORS®). 
125Id. 
126Id.  
127Id. (opening statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Chairman, House Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions). 
128See generally Bank Holding Companies and Change in Bank Control, 66 Fed. Reg. 307.   
12912 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3). 
130Hearings, supra note 81 (opening statement of Richard A. Mendenhall, President, 
National Association of REALTORS®). 
131Id. 
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time of enactment, demonstrates that Congress deemed these activities to be 
commercial, not financial.132 
The NAR also attacks the argument that the proposed rule will be beneficial to 
consumers.  The NAR notes that “[t]he real estate brokerage industry is already 
characterized by fierce competition, market efficiencies, and ease of entry so that 
there is nothing gained by consumers by permitting [financial holding companies’] 
entrance.”133  In fact, the NAR argues that the proposed rule would actually have 
adverse effects on consumers because financial holding companies and national 
banks possess advantages that their nonbank competitors do not possess.134  These 
advantages include the protection provided by federal deposit insurance, which 
reduces the cost of funds for insured depository institutions, and the special access to 
credit from the Federal Reserve and Federal Home Loan Banks, where banks can 
borrow at below market rates that are not available to other businesses.135  Opponents 
of the rule assert that these advantages would provide a substantial competitive edge 
over nonbank real estate brokers, and while this might result in a short-term decrease 
in real estate commissions and other transaction costs, the stifling of competition and 
limitation of consumer choices would ultimately be at the expense of the 
consumer.136 
VI.  THE PROPOSED RULE HIGHLIGHTS THE INADEQUACIES OF THE  
GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT  
A.  The Language Employed is Too Broad to Accomplish the Goals of the Act 
The debate over whether financial holding companies and financial subsidiaries 
of national banks should be permitted to engage in real estate brokerage and 
management services is certainly heated, with both sides asserting strong arguments.  
Regardless of the outcome, however, the debate has demonstrated some of the 
inadequacies in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regarding the addition of permitted 
activities.137  The first major criticism of the Act is that the language employed by 
Congress is far too broad to accomplish Congress’s goal of expanding the powers of 
financial holding companies while maintaining the separation of banking and 
commerce.  The problem of over-inclusive language was noted by Laurence Meyer 
of the Federal Reserve Board, who said that Congress “wrote a very nuanced bill 
with a lot of flexibility.  On the one hand, [Congress] considered and rejected a broad 
mixing of banking and commerce.  But . . . provide[d] opportunities for mixing 
banking and commerce.”138  In theory, the provision would simply expand the limits 
                                                                
132Id.  
133Id.  
134Hearings, supra note 81 (opening statement of Richard A. Mendenhall, President, 
National Association of REALTORS®). 
135Id.  
136Id. 
13712 U.S.C. § 1843(k).  
138Hearings, supra note 81 (testimony of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
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of the “closely related to banking” standard, but the practical reality is that the 
language employed by Congress provides no real limit to the types of activities that 
may be permissible under the Act.  In addition to allowing financial holding 
companies to engage in activities that are financial in nature, the Act permits those 
institutions to engage in activities “incidental to such financial activity”139 or any 
activity that is “complementary to a financial activity.”140  Webster’s Dictionary 
defines “incidental” as “occurring by chance; of secondary importance; arising out of 
something else,”141 while “complementary” is defined as “serving to complete.”142  
Thus, the plain language of the statute would allow financial holding companies not 
only to engage in financial activities, but also in non-financial activities that simply 
arise out of financial activities or serve to complete financial activities.  While 
Congress has stated that its intention was to expand the scope of financial holding 
companies,143 Congress also reaffirmed its intention to uphold the separation between 
finance and commerce.144  While in the modern economy it is difficult to determine a 
bright line between financial and commercial activities, the demarcation between 
those commercial activities that are considered incidental or complementary to 
financial activities and those that are not is a far more arduous task. 
Several members of the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions felt that if 
the proposed activities are permitted under the Act, it would cause a slippery slope, 
resulting in the total mixing of banking and commerce.145  As Robert Nielsen of the 
National Association of Home Builders noted, “[i]f this proposal is allowed to go 
forward, it would be difficult to predict what activities would not fall under 
[financial activities].”146  On numerous occasions throughout the debate, for example, 
engaging in real estate brokerage and management activities has been analogized to 
engaging in the sale of automobiles.147  An automobile is clearly a tangible asset, as 
is a piece of real estate, but the purchase of both types of assets generally involves 
some level of financing.  Some commentors conjectured that if the current proposal 
is accepted, an argument could be made for permitting the sale of automobiles.148  
While this proposition may appear far-fetched at first, it may actually be a logical 
result of the Act as currently written.  Once an activity is identified as a financial 
                                                                
13912 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(A). 
14012 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B). 
141WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 489 (1989). 
142WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 200 (1989). 
143Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Rep. Michael Oxley). 
144Id. (opening statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus, Chairman, House Financial Services 
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions). 
145Id. (testimony of Rep. Bob Riley).  
146Id. (statement of Robert Nielsen, on behalf of the National Association of Home 
Builders). 
147See generally Hearings, supra note 81. 
148Hearings, supra note 81 (testimony of Rep. Bob Riley). Rep. Riley further asserted, “I 
promise you, there is more financial activity in an automobile dealership than there is in any 
real estate brokerage company in this country.” Id. 
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activity or incidental to a financial activity, it creates a potential nexus of other 
activities that are related to the newly permissible activity.149   
The statute enumerates several factors that the Board must take into account in 
determining whether an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity.150  Among these factors are changes in the marketplace or in technology.151  
While it is clear that Congress intended to enable financial holding companies to 
adapt to changing market and technological conditions, the language employed by 
the statute is flawed.  The statute actually allows financial activities to be defined, in 
part, by market conditions.  The danger in such a proposition should be obvious.  If 
financial activities are defined by the market, the mere fact that a number of less-
regulated institutions that compete with financial holding companies engage in a 
certain commercial activity could result in that activity being delineated a financial 
activity.  Laurence Meyer of the Federal Reserve Board noted the difficulties in 
applying the provision, saying that “[t]he [Gramm-Leach-Bliley] Act establishes 
certain factors that the Board and Treasury must consider, but it otherwise leaves the 
agencies with significant discretion and very little guidance regarding what is and 
what is not a financial activity.”152  Furthermore, with such broad discretion, it is 
unlikely that the judiciary would find that the regulators had exceeded their authority 
should a determination that an activity is permissible under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act ever be challenged.  Thus it appears that the language employed by the statute is 
too broad to limit the power of financial holding companies to activities that are truly 
financial in nature or reasonably related to financial activities.  
This problem is further complicated by the fourth factor that the Federal Reserve 
Board must take into account: “whether such activity is necessary or appropriate to 
allow a financial holding company . . . to compete effectively with any company 
seeking to provide financial services.”153  Again, this provision requires the 
regulators to look to the market to define a financial activity.  This provision is even 
more expansive than the previous provision for two reasons.  First, this factor allows 
the regulators to consider whether an activity is either necessary or appropriate for 
financial holding companies to compete.154  While it would presumably be difficult 
to prove that it is necessary for a financial holding company to engage in a non-
financial activity in order to compete effectively, proving that it is appropriate for a 
financial holding company to compete is a far lower burden.  In fact, it would 
seemingly be more difficult to prove that an activity engaged in by a competitor of a 
financial holding company is an inappropriate activity for a financial holding 
company.   
This problem is further exacerbated by the remainder of the factor, which 
provides that that Board must consider whether the proposed activity would allow 
                                                                
149Id. (testimony of Rep. Charles Gonzalez). 
15012 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3).  
151Id. 
152Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
15312 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(3)(D).  
154Id. 
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financial holding companies to compete “with any company seeking to provide 
financial services.”155  Again, it appears that the broad language employed by 
Congress stretches the scope of the statute beyond what was originally intended.   
Under this provision, the competitive marketplace in which financial holding 
companies compete consists of any company merely seeking to provide financial 
services.  Thus, it is not limited to financial holding companies or even companies 
primarily engaging in financial activities, but it would presumably include 
traditionally “commercial” companies such as manufacturers and retailers that 
provide or are seeking to provide financial services as a complement to their existing 
business lines.   
If the proposed rule is not adopted, the debate is far from over.  As previously 
mentioned, in addition to the “financial in nature or incidental to [a] financial 
activity” standard, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also includes a provision that would 
allow banks to engage in any activity that “is complementary to a financial activity 
and does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository 
institutions or the financial system generally.”156  Thus, if the banks are not 
successful in having real estate brokerage and management services deemed 
financial in nature or incidental to a financial activity, they will likely request that the 
activities be declared “complementary” activities.  The Federal Reserve Board and 
Secretary of the Treasury intentionally did not seek public comment on whether the 
proposed activities were complementary to financial activity because they were 
asked only to define real estate brokerage and management activities as financial in 
nature.157  Laurence Meyer, a member of the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System alluded to this likelihood in response to the NAR’s opposition to the 
proposed rule, stating that “[i]f one accepts their contention that brokering real estate 
is really a commercial activity, the question can then be raised whether real estate 
brokerage should be permitted as an activity that is ‘complementary to a financial 
activity.’”158 
Clearly, many of the arguments both for and against declaring that real estate 
brokerage and management services are financial activities would be relevant to a 
determination of whether the activities are complementary to a financial activity.  
However, in addition to finding a complementary relationship, the Act requires that 
the activity “does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository 
institutions or the financial system generally”159 before adding it to the list of 
permissible activities.  This requires the agencies to conduct further analysis to 
determine the effects of the proposed activity on the safety and soundness of not only 
banks, but of all participants in the financial services industry.160  While the burden 
of establishing a complementary relationship between the activities provided by 
                                                                
155Id. 
15612 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).  
157Hearings, supra note 81 (statement of Laurence H. Meyer, Member, Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
158Id. 
15912 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B). 
160Id. 
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banks and other financial service institutions and the activities of real estate 
brokerage and management services should be met with relative ease, the National 
Association of REALTORS® and other opponents of the proposed rule may have a 
legitimate argument regarding safety and soundness concerns.   
While a debate on the effect of the proposed rule on the safety and soundness of 
depository institutions and the financial system as a whole was not directly relevant 
to the proposal, the issue was addressed by some of the parties.161  Richard J. 
Parsons, testifying on behalf of The Financial Services Roundtable asserted that 
“brokerage poses little risk to the banking system” because a real estate broker acts 
solely in an agency capacity, rather than as a principal.162  Thus, the broker does not 
have an interest in the property, and only derives fee income from arranging the 
transaction.  On the surface, it may appear that allowing financial holding companies 
to engage in these activities would pose no risk to the safety and soundness of the 
institution.  However, there are a number of situations where engaging in real estate 
could potentially pose a risk to safety and soundness.  For example, a bank may be 
tempted to underwrite a mortgage that is below its normal standards if it is able to 
increase its overall return with a real estate brokerage fee.  If the bank adopted this 
practice, it could potentially affect the overall soundness of the institution.  The 
problem, however, is that the statute only excludes activities that pose a substantial 
risk to safety and soundness of the financial institution.  While arguments can be 
made that a particular activity, such as real estate brokerage or management, poses a 
risk to the safety and soundness of a financial institution, meeting the burden of 
“substantial risk” would be difficult.  It is clear that Congress intended to expand the 
scope of permissible activities beyond what was permissible under the “closely 
related to banking” standard.  It is equally clear, however, that by using terms such 
as “incidental,” “complementary,” “necessary or appropriate,” and “substantial risk,” 
the statute goes beyond what was originally intended by the drafters, who sought to 
maintain the separation between finance and commerce.163   
B.  The Roles of the Legislature and Regulators are Not Clearly Defined   
A second major criticism of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is that the roles of the 
legislature and the regulators are not clearly defined in the Act.  This is demonstrated 
by the proposed rule and the testimony regarding the rule.164  The actual language of 
the rule does not indicate a strong sentiment by the agencies proposing the rule that 
the activities are in fact financial activities or incidentally related to a financial 
activity.165  The proposed rule appears to be a request for additional information 
rather than a statement of position.166  This issue was discussed during a hearing on 
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the rule in the House Subcommittee on Financial Institutions, when Rep. Melvin 
Watt (D-NC) specifically asked Donald Hammond167 whether someone in the 
Treasury actually advocated the proposed rule or if it “would in effect be a rule 
promulgated for debate purposes to clarify the law?”168  Mr. Hammond responded 
that the rule was proposed in order to interpret the statute, stating that the issue of 
whether real estate brokerage and management services were financial activities or 
incidentally related to financial activities “very clearly met a threshold standard, that 
the request came in, [and] met enough of the statutory requirements to put it forward 
as a proposal.”169  He further noted that between the time the rule was initially 
proposed and the time of the hearing, the Administration had changed, so the 
sentiment of the Department of Treasury may have changed as well.170  Laurence 
Meyer, representing the Federal Reserve Board, testified that it was not crucial that 
the agencies advocate the position, so long as the request was reasonable enough to 
seek public comment.171  He added, however, that the proposals are usually 
supported “by some sense of advocacy.”172  Further, it was the understanding of the 
agencies that the proposition of a rule was the proper mechanism for determining 
whether an activity was within the parameters of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and 
that after agreeing that a threshold case could be made, the agencies “put it out in this 
form to get the discussion going, to get feedback from practitioners, from market 
participants from both sides to help us sort out the issues and hopefully make a very 
informed decision.”173  From these statements by the representatives of the Federal 
Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury, it is unclear as to the level of 
support for the proposed rules from the respective agencies.  What is clear, however, 
is that the statute is ambiguous as to when a proposal should be issued.174     
This lack of clarity has already led to tremendous inefficiencies.  While the 
Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury issued the proposed rule 
primarily as a solicitation of public comment, both houses of Congress have 
responded with proposed legislation to render the proposed rule moot.175  These 
resolutions have been referred to the appropriate committees and are pending further 
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action.176  Clearly, Congress would not have vested the regulatory agencies with the 
authority to determine that activities were permissible under the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act if it intended to enact separate legislation in response to each proposed 
rule.  However, because the roles of both the regulators and the legislature were not 
clearly defined in the Act, that is exactly what has resulted.  
C.  The Scope of the Rule is Too Expansive 
One of the major differences between the “closely related to banking” standard 
under the Bank Holding Company Act and the “financial activity or incidentally 
related to a financial activity” standard under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is the 
scope of its effect.  Prior to the enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, “the law 
directed the Board to consider whether banks engaged in the activity, but did not 
explicitly authorize the [Federal Reserve] Board to consider whether other financial 
service providers engaged in the activity.”177  The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act, however, “represents a significant expansion of the Board’s capacity to 
consider the competitive realities of the U.S. financial marketplace in determining 
the permissibility of activities for [financial holding companies].”178  As previously 
stated, twenty-five states and the District of Columbia currently permit their state-
chartered banks to engage in real estate brokerage.179  If financial holding companies 
and financial subsidiaries of national banks are permitted to engage in these 
activities, they would arguably be able to more adequately compete with the state-
chartered banks in the states where such activities are currently permitted.  
Conversely, however, it would appear that the newly empowered financial holding 
companies and national banks would have a competitive advantage over state-
chartered banks in the states where these activities are currently impermissible.  It is 
likely, then, that the states that have historically not permitted real estate brokerage 
and management by banks would be pressured by the state banks to amend their 
current regulations to allow banks to engage in previously impermissible activities.  
Those states that do amend their regulations may do so contrary to the reasons that 
have kept them from amending their regulations prior to the current proposal.  Those 
states that do not amend their regulations to permit state banks to offer real estate 
brokerage and management services could be hurt as state-chartered institutions lose 
market share to potentially out-of-state financial holding companies.  
Further exacerbating the issue is the fact that many states have “wild card 
statutes,”180 which would automatically permit state-chartered banks to engage in any 
activity permissible for a national bank or financial holding company, taking the 
power to decide on the issue away from state regulators.  This could create a 
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multitude of problems, as state-chartered banks could engage in these activities 
without adhering to the heightened requirements of financial holding company 
status.  As currently written, the rule does not include any provisions that would limit 
the scope of the Act to applicable state laws, therefore preserving the integrity of the 
dual banking system.181 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The rule to permit financial holding companies and financial subsidiaries of 
nationally chartered banks to engage in real estate brokerage and management 
activities was proposed over a year ago, and there is no indication that the issue will 
be resolved in the very near future.182  Regardless of how the issue is finally resolved, 
the current debate has highlighted some of the inadequacies of the provision in the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act that provides for the expansion of the list of permissible 
activities for financial holding companies.  Among these inadequacies are the overly 
broad language of the statute, the ambiguously defined roles of the regulatory 
agencies, and the expansive scope of the provision.  When enacted, the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act had the strong support of the legislature, regulatory agencies, 
industry groups and consumer groups,183 but if the above-listed deficiencies are not 
addressed, the effectiveness of the Act could be severely compromised.  
The most efficient and effective manner in which to correct the perceived 
inadequacies of the Act would be for Congress to amend the provisions expanding 
the list of permissible activities.  Throughout the debate on the issue, there has been a 
clear sentiment in Congress that the broad language and ambiguities of the Act 
should be addressed by the legislative branch rather than leaving it to the 
interpretation of the regulatory agencies of the executive branch.184  This sentiment is 
evidenced by the comments made by a number of legislators during the House 
subcommittee hearings, as well as the by the pending bills in the House and Senate.   
It is not uncommon for a law to be amended shortly after its promulgation if the 
effects of the law are not commensurate with the intent.  Some members of Congress 
have suggested that the provisions of the Act allowing for the expansion of 
permissible activities may need to be amended as well.  In his opening statement 
during the hearing on the issue, Rep. Paul Kanjorski stated, “[i]f the agencies fail to 
deliberate on this issue judiciously, Congress may find itself again considering 
legislation designed to close the loopholes created by their regulatory excess.”185  
Later in his testimony, he accused the regulatory agencies of expanding the authority 
beyond what was intended and actually granted by Congress.186  Rep. Brad Sherman 
also felt that permitting financial holding companies to engage in real estate 
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brokerage and management activities exceeded the authority of the regulating 
agencies, saying that if the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act were to be dramatically 
expanded, it should be done by Congress, “and there shouldn’t be an end run around 
the authority of Congress where we are told less than a year after we pass a bill it 
needs to be updated by putting something into it that many of us who supported the 
bill never intended.”187 
The first step in the amendment process would be to narrow the language of the 
provisions to more accurately match the actual intent of Congress.  It seems clear 
that if financial holding companies are permitted to engage in activities that are only 
“incidental” or “complementary” to a financial activity, involvement in such 
activities should be more restricted than involvement in true financial activities.  The 
extent to which these activities are to be limited, perhaps via increased capital 
requirements for subsidiaries engaging in these activities or a limitation on the 
percentage of net income a financial holding company could derive from such 
activities, is beyond the scope of this Note.  However, simply limiting the power to 
engage in “incidental” or “complementary” activities should greatly reduce the room 
for abuse under the Act.   
Next, Congress should amend the factors that the agencies must consider “[i]n 
determining whether an activity is financial in nature or incidental to a financial 
activity.”188  While it seems reasonable for the agencies to consider changes in the 
marketplace and technology when determining the permissibility of an activity, it is 
very dangerous that a financial activity could actually be defined by the market.  
Thus, Congress might allow financial holding companies to engage in non-financial 
activities based on competitive factors, but any involvement in such activities should 
be severely limited to what is absolutely necessary for the financial holding 
companies to compete.   
Finally, when considering “complementary” activities, Congress should limit the 
ability of financial holding companies to engage in such activities beyond only those 
that “pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness” of a bank.189  It has already 
been established that “complementary” activities are wholly commercial activities 
that simply serve to complete financial activities.190  These activities clearly would 
not have been permissible prior to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and do indeed 
involve a mixing of banking of commerce.  Therefore, it would seem reasonable to 
prohibit involvement in such activities that pose “moderate” or even “significant” 
risks to the safety or soundness of banks.  While terms such as “moderate” and 
“significant” would be subject to interpretation, they would clearly be more 
restrictive than the present “substantial risk” standard.   
The second major initiative for Congress should be to further define the role of 
the regulatory agencies in the process of expanding the list of permissible activities 
under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.  While the Act seemed to clearly describe the 
process to be followed by the Federal Reserve Board and Secretary of the Treasury 
upon a request for a determination of whether an activity is permissible under the 
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Act,191 it is clear from the subsequent testimony that confusion exists among the 
parties involved.  Improving the language of the statute, as recommended above, 
should serve to minimize much of the confusion.  However, Congress should also 
explicitly provide the criteria necessary before a public rulemaking is proposed.  As 
previously noted, both the Federal Reserve Board and the Secretary of the Treasury 
interpreted the statute to require a request for public comment once a threshold case 
is made by the party requesting that a determination be made.192  It seems apparent 
from the testimony and subsequent comments by members of Congress, however, 
that it was their intention that the agencies actually make a determination that an 
activity is financial in nature or incidentally related to a financial activity before 
proposing a rule.193  Resolving this ambiguity would minimize the inefficiencies of 
agencies proposing rules that they do not actually advocate and Congress in turn 
proposing legislation against proposed rules that seem contrary to their intent.   
The final step in the amendment process would be to attempt to limit the effect of 
the provisions. It seems clear that adding to the list of permissible activities for 
financial holding companies will dramatically change the competitive landscape for 
all companies providing financial services.  Congress can limit the scope of the Act 
by requiring that such activities be “conducted pursuant to applicable state laws.”194  
If Congress amends the provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act as suggested, the 
law will more closely reflect the original intent of Congress and would remain an 
invaluable vehicle for adapting to changes in the financial services industry for years 
to come.  
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